# Solder-Defined Computers for Provable Immunity Against Hacking and Malware

Marc W. Abel

Department of Computer Science and Engineering 11 May 2023



#### Three walls to defend

- Software
- Personnel
- Hardware

#### Four kinds of hardware problems

- Outdated approaches ignore security
- Excessive complexity hides problems
- Manufacturer interests prevail
- Silicon chips can't be repaired later


#### Three freedoms sought

- Independence from vendors
- Full ownership rights
- Permanent security

#### Two enablers of success


- Surface-mount technology
- Firmware in RAM as logic





Seven Basic Logic Gates A D flip-flop only changes its output when:

- 1. told it's time to check, and
- 2. output doesn't already reflect the input.




## A RAM can remember a lot of 18-bit words.


# 18-bit "address" where store or retrieve will occur


#### RAM Random-Access Memory


18-bit word to store to or retrieve from the given address




of the number 63








# CPU Principal Data Paths



© 2021 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from M. W. Abel, "Solder-Defined Architectures for Trusted Computing," NAECON 2021— IEEE National Aerospace and Electronics Conference, 2021, p. 251, doi: 10.1109/NAECON49338.2021.9696432.


#### Data Layers of ALU



### ALU with carry propagation elements shown

Small digits that are not subscripts indicate number of wires.

#### **Superposition of ALU Operations**




Same board space

theta	alpha0	alphal	alpha2	beta3	374.28	<pre>[] ]] ]] [] r10k r10k r10k ]] ]] ]] r10k r10k r10k ]] ]] ]] r10k r10k r10k</pre>	374.35	or an nand no nand an	d and  r and  d and	
beta0	gammað	gammal	gamma2	beta4	374.26	aod0 aod1	374.37	nor an and o mand an	 d nand  r nand 	nor r10k
betal	alpha3	alpha4	alpha5	beta5	 r10k r10k r10          r10k r10k r10    r10k	E	374.40 flop  flop or xor xor	Di		iii iii iii   buf nand nand   iii iii iii   inv and rl0k   rl0k rl0k rl0k
beta2	gamma3	gamma4	gamma5	giant6	giant4	giant3	s	D	ı	r10k r10k r10k 10k r10k r10k
	nand nand and		·	giant7  	giant5 	giant2  giant1	 	xor xo		nor buf
MØ	and or nand	R	L	374.32	80mhz	giant0	с	and an		buf
374.22		374.21	conctrl		374.11	374.9	374.17	xor xo	  r xor	flop flop and
374.41	M1	374.20	374.30	P	374.12	374.10	374.18	xor an	d and 	nand xor xor  xor or flop
374.13	flop flop flop	374.34	374.0	zeta	374.5	flop flop flop	374.15	xor xo	r xor	374.42
374.14	flop flop flop  flop flop flop	374.33	374.1		374.6	flop flop  flop xor	374.16	and an	  d and	374.43
374.7	374.23	374.4 flop	and and and	374.2	374.25	and and and		xor xo	 r xor 	and and and
374.8	374.24	flop  flop nand nand	and and and  and and or	374.3	374.19	xor flop flop  flop		xor an		and and and  and and

# Circuit Board Floorplan

as of 11 May 2023



# **Fast Enough For**

- Hardened desktop apps
- Electronic mail
- Light- to moderate-use servers
- Controlling objects that move
- Process controls
- Peripheral & device controllers
- Telephony
- Modest Ethernet switches

# **Too Slow For**

- Most Web surfing
- Machine learning
- Image and video processing
- Self-driving vehicles
- Fast raster or vector graphics
- Fast symmetric cryptography
- Fast asymmetric cryptography
- Bioinformatics

# **Security Improvements**

- No vendor lock-in
- No secret functionality
- No purpose of use limitations
- No right to repair infringements
- No privilege escalation via the CPU
- No license fees to build, use, or modify
- Sticky out-of-range flag for all arithmetic
- No encrypted or closed-source firmware
- No DRAM or DRAM-associated vulnerabilities
- Every I/O device confined to its own bus and buffer
- No CPU persistent state except for one firmware IC
- No complex logic from IC manufacturers within CPU
- No program access to stack except CALL and RETURN
- Stack overflow unlikely, can't lead to privilege escalation
- No branch to addresses not present in the instruction word
- Mixed-sign variants for add, subtract, multiply, shift, abs. value

# **Before This Can Be Built**

- I/O subsystem to support SPI and I<sup>2</sup>C buses
- Firmware loader
- Resolution of clock skew concern

# Ways to Get Involved

- Firmware upgrade for faster multiplication
- Support for integer division
- Floating point like IEEE 754-2019, but 36- and 72-bit formats
- Floating point for compatibility (32- and 64-bit formats)
- More assembler features
- Lightweight operating system
- Lightweight scripting language
- Lightweight programming language
- Minimalist toolchain that can be audited
- I/O device drivers
- TCP/IP stack
- TLS 1.3
- New block cipher to leverage architecture
- Formal verification (similar to seL4 or INTEGRITY-178B)



#### https://people.wright.edu/marc.abel